

Crisis/buzz

Can't this:

Find out

With history of the recent
past danger to living.

- Nuclear Crisis?

- How close were we - when - to war?

- to sudden "retaliation"?

- to alerts?

- Accidents, + near-accidents?

- Invasion plans: Cuba, 1961-62 (after?)

Crisis/bering
Countries:

Find out

Will history of the recent
past danger to humanity

- Nuclear Crisis?

- How close were we - were - to ruin?

- to sudden "retaliation"?

- to shuts?

- Accidents + near-accidents?

- Invasion plan. Cuba, 1961-62 (after?)

Stevenson - Sec 10/31/62

Sec Amb told C. Short

Order from K to dismantle received between 1 and 3 pm.
Started dismantling by at 5 on Sunday. Will be all over
it later by Friday, when we will have finished
bulldozing of sites. Even the pads will be gone, but
no Cuban observation of the dismantling is permitted.

As to aircraft, Rumsfeld assumed that no Cubans had
not been trained to fly the any equipment, low-rend
will go. All the A-4, both SAM + conventional, is owned by
Cubans. It was a Cuban school that shot down our plane.

Castro is frustrated, intense, psychotic.

Package please by off the recon till Friday. After that you
will find they have bulldozed all of the sites.

11/1/62 Bell - Sec Castro talked as though he had all the sites

aircraft and he did boast that it was the Cubans who had

Analyze K's proposals on Turkey - light of Bergamini
theory: emphasis on symmetry of "right," based on
"equal" threat capability. (e.g. 27 Oct).

if Centre persuaded SAM detachment commander to shoot U-2 -
which needed work on Oct 27 after being studied -
this comes pretty close to catalytic action (i.e., peculiar
sort of "unauthorized" action).

Or could it have been accident? as SAMs activated?

No mention of SAM activation 27 Oct.

Consequences

- Incidents?
- 1) Shutdown of U-2 Oct 27?
 - 2) Detection of SU by U-2, Oct 27?
 - 3) SU cable-cutting transfer?
 - 4) SU Cosmos debris?

Let down Major Anderson. Blyke himself is not at all
persuaded that this was ^{not} first not only heartfulness in his
part.

He feels that there is a state of very definite kind of
hysteria down there at the moment; that they are probably
going to be looking for flights today and that they are going
to throw everything that they have. After Castro makes his speech
he thinks that if we could delay until tomorrow that the
chances of getting into any real trouble are considerably diminished,
particularly if we change the flight patterns.

(Mike didn't want to have to invite Govin, didn't want Dallas... or?)

Ed. said on a Security Council meeting that Castro would let him
to hold the meeting off till after the 6th.

See why the 6th!

Ball: Why, are there

Ball telegrams: Stearns, Ball, on

Cuban shootdown of U-2

McN - also low-level mission

Nov 1

Cuba II

Note: early instincts to let "crisis" pass were

quickly discarded -

(State: B Ball, McN: Cleveland

Defang for Stearns ... McN, Ball,

Taylor!

even faster than surprise attack.

Key elements in SU draw-back:

PFK { 1. Ultimatum
discarded: { 2. Inquiry
 { 3. If with U-2 shot down

+ Cuban shootdown!

Analyze K's proposals in light of bargaining theory: implies an asymmetry of "right," based on "equal" threat capability. (e.g. 27 Oct).

If Castro persuaded SAM detachments commander to shoot U-2 — which needed work as Oct 27 letter being studied — this comes pretty close to catalytic action (or, perhaps sort of "unauthorized" action).

Or could it have been accident? as SAMs activated?

No mention ^{by} of SAM activation 27 Oct.

Converges
'incidents'?

- 1) Shutdown of U-2 Oct 27?
- 2) Detention of SU by U-2, Oct 27?
- 3) SU cable setting transfer?
- 4) SU Cosmos detritus?

Crisis/bering
Committee:

Find out

- Nuclear Crisis?

- How close were we - when - to miss?

- to sudden "retaliation"?

- to shoots?

- Accidents + near-accidents?

- Invasion plan. Cuba, 1961-62 (after?)

With history of the recent
past danger to humanity

Ross

Bob Munson ORR

Arach Bush OSI (e.g. on "insurgents" attacks on 26 Oct)

Mr. Skippy Burdick OSI

15 Jan 63 CIB

24 March Castro

NSA Frank Allen 13-5334 ^{same}

28 Oct 10 different Frintants hit up on U-2 flight 27 Oct;
only 1 radio, 19 Oct. This didn't happen later.

Also, multi-channel comm channel, an defense, Russian, on 27 Oct.

14 April 64 On night of 26 Oct 62 an "attack" on an unidentified base
camp was in progress. The nationality of the attacking forces was
not national. This attack was possibly directed against the
Los Angeles SSIM site adjacent to the Base site and believed
to be in direct comm. with them. During this time, M informed
X that Santiago de Cuba that he was "advancing" with his unit.
After M indicated that these persons may have "killed" during his "advance"
and that 15 others were wounded. Subsequent discussions indicated
national regiments for surgeons and the dispatch of senior doctors
M ultimately suggested that a report of the whole affair be sent to
[Timing?] ^(~~the same~~)
Vf a later conversation revealed he was to report to Vin from the following
morning. The US recon mission was shot down the morning after [?] the
base

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Arach Bush OSI (e.g. on "insurgents" attacks on 26 Oct)

Mrs. Betty Burdick OSI

15 Jan 63 CB

26 ~~Nov~~ Castro

NSA ^{same} Frank Allen 13-5334

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only 1 earlier, 17 Oct. This didn't happen later.

Also, multi-channel comm channel; air defense, Russian, on 27 Oct.

14 April 64 On night of 26 Oct 62 an "attack" on an unidentified base
camp was in progress. The nationality of the attacking forces was
not mentioned. This attack was possibly directed against the

Los Angeles SSN site adjacent to the Barro site and believed
to be in direct comm. with them. During this time, M informed
(Barro commander)

X at Santiago de Cuba that he was "advancing" with his unit
later M indicated that three persons may have "died" during his "advance"
and that 15 others were wounded. Subsequent discussions indicated
mentioned requirements for surgeons and the dispatch of senior doctors

[Timing?] M ultimately suggested that a report of the whole affair be sent to
Vf a later conversation revealed he was to report to Vm person the following
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1967+ SU Postures

a) Deterrence + minimum pre-emption
capability (includes current
estimates for 1962-67). 3 types.

b) Deterrence + war-fighting capability;
credibility based on parity,
imitation of US. [2] implies SU
with 500+ missiles less than US]

c) Deterrence based on highly protected
regions, defenses + hardening + big
warheads; deters by capability to inflict
damage.

Assumes: 1) Deterrence primary 2) some
duty to blunt secondary, 3) important
capability vs. Sovietia; 4) some first-strike
cap. 2. 1st 1st strike

retaining capability (sales) for 50 million

$$\begin{array}{r} 41 \\ \times 16 \\ \hline 246 \\ 410 \\ \hline 656 \end{array}$$

fatalities. "I do not call 50 m fatal.

acceptable." [The mention of Europe I

[McN takes note of that now, if he
carries out Am. action/Berlin threat.

Does he want to say: No longer plan to

ref on umbrella over Europe in 1967?]

"My system provides more insurance

for SC to avoid attack on US or

allies." [Should say: USAF system

is not 12-billion worth better than

McN's, as a "first-strike system."]

[Either explain that McN means to

shift current objectives, in 65; or,

shut up on subject.]

1964's handling. 4-4/807 now:

4/20/65? 100 5034. now.

1967+ SU Postures

a) Deterrence + minimum pre-emption
credibility (includes current
estimate for 1962-67). 3 types

b) Deterrence + war-fighting capability;
credibility based on parity,
imitation of US. [e] implies SU
with 500+ missiles less than US]

c) Deterrence based on highly protected
system, defenses + hardening + big
warhead; deter by capability to inflict
damage.

Assume: 1) Deterrence primary 2) some
duty to blunt, secondary, 3) important
credibility vs. Europe; 4) good first-strike
cap. 2. 1000-1500.

30
E7: 650 MARM/1224

US: 620 B-52, 585 B-47.

63: 22~ weapons } about
9441 MT

64: 20~ weapons
54~ MT

200 MT

500 infrared MM (AF. 500 MM)

7150 infrared MM

No Skybolt. No RS-70. No Regulus.

By PACCS; OUCG for SAC. (5 NRACPP)

6 Planes (up to 41 = 6.56 minutes)

I have come to conclusion USAF wants
a first-strike capability. Quote: "by
capability to make first strike credible,
in light of the circumstances &
alternatives." Unfeasible; 30 may
retain capability (only) for 50 million

41
16
246
41
676

fatalities. "I do not call 50 m fatal,
acceptable." [No mention of number]

[McN takes note of that name, if he
carries out Ann Arbor/Berlin threat.

Does he want to say: No longer plan to
ref on umbrella over Europe in 1967?]

"My system provides more incentives
for SO to avoid attack on US or

allies." [Should say: NSAF system
is not 12-billion worth better than

140V's, as a "first-strike system"]

[Either explain that McN means to
shift current objectives, in 65; or,

went up on subject.]

19680. heading. A-44807 now;

A180M in 65? 100 30342 now.